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Abstract 
 
Previous research has suggested that host communities experience positive welfare effects 
following a large refugee influx, with local agricultural producers receiving the largest benefits. 
However, this may not occur in host communities where production inputs such as water are 
scarce. I adapt a dynamic economic model of groundwater extraction to analyze the 
environmental impact of the Syrian refugee influx from 2013 onward on the Amman Wadi As-
Sir aquifer in the northern region of Jordan. I then show that, given model assumptions, 
agricultural producers in the Jordanian Highlands experience negative welfare effects as the 
resource is allocated away from producing sectors of the economy in order to provide for the 
refugee population. The extent of this effect varies given different scenarios of repatriation or 
resettlement, and is long-lived as the aquifer is depleted. Finally, I discuss policy implications for 
increasing water security in Jordan, focusing on two fronts: long-term capacity (e.g. wastewater 
reuse, infrastructure rehabilitation, and/or desalination) and local capacity (e.g. community water 
projects). It is left for future research to test the effectiveness of specific policies. 
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1.   Introduction 
There are more displaced persons across the globe today than at any time since World War 
II, when statistics were first collected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR 2014).1 In the past year, approximately 51.2 million forced migrants—internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees—have been stripped of their livelihoods and driven from 
their homes, some never to return. Over two-thirds of refugees will remain in exile for at least 
five years, considered a protracted refugee crisis (World Bank 2010). While efforts to ensure the 
human rights of refugees under international law should only be reinforced, it is also important to 
consider the impacts felt by the countries hosting them. Refugees can have profound impacts, 
both good and bad, upon arrival in their new countries depending on the economic base of the 
host population as well as local environmental conditions in the host community. In fact, an 
increasing body of literature in refugee studies cites water as a significant source of tension 
between refugee and host communities (Card 1990; Borton, Brusset, and Hallam 1996; Whitaker 
1999; Landau 2002; Cortes 2005; Lach 2007; World Bank 2011; Farishta 2014). However, there 
is a lack of research in this area in the field of economics. 
The Middle East and North Africa2 region hosts the largest number of refugees registered by 
UNHCR at just over 4 million (UNHCR 2014). This does not include an additional 2.8 million 
exiled Palestinians registered in Jordan and Lebanon under mandate of the UN Relief and Works 
Agency (UNRWA). With persistent and unfortunate conflict a reality in Syria and now again in 
Iraq, as well as general political instability across much of the region since the Arab Spring of 
                                                          
1 According to the most recent estimates, end-year 2013. 
2 Includes the 22 Arab League nations, minus Sudan and Somalia, plus Turkey, Iran, and Israel. 
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2011, the large refugee population in the Middle East does not promise to abate any time soon. 
Moreover, host communities in the Middle East, home to nearly 75% of the world’s arid and 
extremely arid lands, are especially vulnerable to refugee-host tensions over water and are worth 
further study (IALC 2013).  
The primary research questions considered in this thesis are: 1) Do local environmental 
conditions increase or decrease the economic benefits experienced by a host community in the 
wake of a refugee crisis and 2) How would this externality on the host population be spread 
across time? Previous research in economics suggests that host communities experience net 
benefits from a refugee influx, with agricultural producers and other owners of capital often 
receiving the largest benefits via increased demand for their goods and falling wages for labor. 
This may not occur, however, if water is scarce and must be diverted away from production to 
provide for water consumption of refugees in cities and camps. This thesis, therefore, contributes 
to the literature by considering how host welfare outcomes might change when host communities 
face pre-existing water scarcity. I use as a case study the Amman-Zarqa basin in the north of 
Jordan sometimes called the Jordanian Highlands (Figure 1), location to one of the largest 
populations of Syrian refugees and Jordan’s most important groundwater aquifer.  
Water resource economists have explored the implications of shocks to groundwater supply 
under scenarios of catastrophic environmental events and climate change (Tsur and Zemel 2004; 
Brozovic and Schenkler 2011; Cachorro et al. 2014). It is plausible that such shocks could also 
be caused by sudden increased water consumption due to large population movements—e.g. a 
forced migration shock—especially if population movements are permanent or semi-permanent 
as in protracted refugee crises. I, therefore, adapt a dynamic economic model of groundwater 
extraction to analyze the expected rate of resource use and water table decline from 2013 onward 
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in the Amman-Zarqa basin. By comparing a base scenario, pre-refugee influx, with scenarios 
given varying levels of refugees, I establish the resulting impact on water resources in the 
Jordanian Highlands. Results show that groundwater in the Amman-Zarqa basin could be 
completely depleted by 2039—two decades ahead of previous forecasts conducted before the 
Syrian refugee crisis (USGS 2011)—accompanied by large monetary losses and economic 
restructuring as irrigated agricultural production declines over time and becomes unfeasible in 
the near future.  
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
provides the contextual background of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Section 4 details the model 
development. Section 5 describes the data used, and Section 6 implements an empirical 
application to analyze host welfare impacts in the Amman-Zarqa basin. I discuss policy 
implications in Section 7 and, finally, Section 8 concludes with suggestions for future research.  
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2.  Literature Review 
A growing literature exists across various academic fields that analyzes the impacts of forced 
migration on host communities. This section discusses research from refugee studies and 
economics. While the latter primarily focuses on quantitative price and income effects for goods 
and households in host communities (Alix-Garcia and Saah 2009; Alix-Garcia et al. 2011; Alix-
Garcia et al. 2012; Maystadt and Duranton 2014), the former offers more qualitative insight into 
the environmental impacts on water resources potentially exacerbated by a large refugee influx 
(Card 1990; Borton, Brusset, and Hallam 1996; Whitaker 1999; Landau 2002; Cortes 2005; Lach 
2007). I first review the most relevant work from the extensive refugee studies literature and then 
the young but emergent line of research on forced migration from economics. 
 
Qualitative Studies 
Jacobsen (1997) has a very nice discussion on how refugee hosting strategies and settlement 
patterns can produce different environmental impacts. She argues that local integration of 
refugees would alleviate many of the problems associated with deforestation and soil degradation 
common in camp environments. Assuming existing water sanitation infrastructure in the host 
community can absorb refugee populations, integration may also alleviate water pollution often 
exacerbated near camps. On the other hand, in dry areas, integration can increase competition 
over scarce water resources as non-camp refugees tend to consume more water per capita than 
they are able to in relatively primitive camps; in some cases, in fact, integration has exacerbated 
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urban crises and led to surges in violence (Zetter and Deikun 2010). Crisp (2002) identifies 
additional concerns with so-called refugee “warehousing” in geographically isolated camps: 
local markets are small or nonexistent, information about markets that do exist but are not 
necessarily nearby is hard to obtain, and high transportation costs prevail. Such obscure and 
remote conditions can lead to refugee populations feeling neglected and frustrated, making them 
prime recruits for armed groups and potentially exacerbating local and regional stability (Czaika 
2005). As an agency created to protect human rights, UNHCR promotes freedom of movement 
and thus local integration into host society over refugee camps, but host governments often do 
not favor local integration because, according to international law, it implies permanent asylum, 
residency status, and eventual citizenship.3 Despite this resistance by host governments, nearly 
half of the global refugee population now reside in cities and towns (World Bank 2010). 
Unsustainable groundwater extraction and declining recharge rates have been reported in 
both non-camp and camp settings (Black 1994). In Darfur, IDP camps primarily receive water 
from several deep boreholes, 30 to 40 meters, often dug by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) (UNEP 2007). The Abu Shouk camp, with a peak population of 80,000 IDPs needing a 
water supply of more than 1,000 cubic meters per day (m3/d), had five of its twelve boreholes 
run dry in 2006. Economic sectors established in relief economies can also increase stress on 
water use. For example, brick-making has become an important source of income for many 
displaced persons in Darfur, which, in addition to water, requires large amounts of wood sourced 
from nearby forests to fire kilns used in the brickmaking process. Halting such economic 
activities is typically not an option, as it is a source of livelihood for IDPs—and NGOs use the 
bricks to construct walls around the camps required by international security standards.  
                                                          
3 Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (cited in Jacobsen 2001). 
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Berry (2008) cites overuse of water sources as one of the major negative environmental 
impacts due to Burundian and Rwandan refugee populations in Tanzania, in addition to cutting 
of trees and bushfires. Berry reports that environmental degradation would be much greater if not 
for NGO implemented environmental management projects, which include tree plantings, 
environmental education, provision of wood-saving stoves, sustainable farming practices, and 
water source rehabilitation. In field interviews and focus groups, many Tanzanians cited water 
resource depletion and blockage of streams by refugees, though one NGO employee questioned 
whether such overuse was more due to local communities’ agricultural and land use practices. 
Such blaming of refugees for environmental problems that they don’t necessarily cause has been 
cited elsewhere, for example, regarding Afghan refugees in Pakistan (Allan 1987).  
Based on survey research, Whitaker (2002) attempted to explain the impacts of refugees on 
agricultural production and economic activity in Tanzania. While the former, in particular, would 
be thought to have implications for water resource use, she does not mention water. Findings, 
however, provide evidence of positive economic impacts due to an enlarged consumer market 
and new source of cheap labor—in some cases, doubling farm production in communities nearest 
to camps. But among local inhabitants not in agricultural production, the uneducated and poor 
appeared to fare much worse than the educated Tanzanians who faced less competition for 
employment. Refugees are not always unskilled, though. Over one-third of Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan, as of 2008, had university or professional degrees and were successful finding jobs in 
universities and hospitals (Crisp et al. 2009). 
Gentry (2009) also studied the economic and environmental impacts of Burundian refugees 
in Tanzania. At the time of the study, there were still nearly 200,000 Burundian refugees in 
Tanzania. Interviews and focus groups conducted with refugees, host community members, and 
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staff from NGOs found that coordination between relief aid and development aid can have 
significant positive effects on both refugee and host communities. The presence of NGOs in the 
local economy created employment for many Tanzanians, and farmers also benefited from the 
World Food Programme’s (WFP) local purchase policy, which requires a purchase quota of 
locally grown foods for refugee operations. Tanzanians also benefited from free healthcare 
accessible to them in the refugee camps. Environmental impacts according to Gentry, however, 
were negative, presenting evidence of significant vegetation loss in immediately surrounding 
areas of the camps using satellite data. Reforestation efforts by NGOs usually were not enough to 
offset losses. Several villages were also negatively affected by water pollution in early stages of 
refugee influx—around 49,000 people or 20% of the local population experienced water quality 
degradation. Though in a few villages, new wells and boreholes were constructed, which 
increased access to safe drinking water for some Tanzanians. Over-poaching of bush meat also 
proved to be very harmful with possible repercussions for the local economy into the future. 
 
Quantitative Studies 
While the economics literature on voluntary migration is relatively robust, that of forced 
migration is still in its infancy—nearly all studies having been completed since 2008 (Ruiz and 
Vargas-Silva 2013). Moreover, most of this research focuses on outcomes of IDPs or refugees, 
not the hosts, and all employ econometric techniques. Research on host outcomes in developing 
countries to date has considered forced migration shocks in Tanzania, South Sudan, and 
Columbia. They are reviewed below.  
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Alix-Garcia and Saah (2009) presented evidence that host communities in Tanzania likely 
experienced overall net benefits in the wake of crises in Burundi and Rwanda during the 1990s, 
which displaced over 700,000 refugees. However, they found that urban households likely 
experienced net welfare losses. These conclusions are based on estimated price effects of food 
aid and non-aid food items and subsequent changes in household wealth indicators over the study 
period. In two follow-up articles, focusing on IDP camps near the town of Nyala in Darfur, the 
authors found similar price effects after also accounting for housing rents (Alix-Garcia et al. 
2011). They also extended previous analysis to more environmental factors with satellite data 
from 2001-2007, finding evidence of significant vegetation loss due to small-scale farming and 
construction of houses and businesses—especially surrounding IDP camps near urban centers 
which afford better market access and increased security (Alix-Garcia et al. 2012). 
In Columbia, Calderon and Ibanez (2009) found that an exogenous shock to the labor 
supply—in this case the result of IDPs fleeing violence in rural areas between 1998 and 2008 to 
more secure urban centers of the country—had negative impacts on wages for all workers in the 
cities that received them. While the migration itself was driven by exogenous factors, to account 
for potential non-random location decisions of the forced migrants, an instrumental variable 
approach was used that interacts the number of civilians killed by illegal armed groups in the 
place of origin with the distance to destination municipalities. Negative labor market outcomes 
for the host community were found to be greater among less skilled workers and in the informal 
sector, where a 10% increase in the share of IDPs reduced hourly wages up to 2.4% and 3%, 
respectively. This is compared to 1.4% wage reduction for all workers. In both the formal and 
informal sectors, female workers tended to suffer a slightly larger wage reduction by about 0.5 
percentage points. 
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Considering the case of Tanzania again, Baez (2011) focused on both short- and long-term 
health and human capital impacts for an especially vulnerable subset of the host population: 
children. Using data from the Kagera Health and Demographic Survey (1991-2004) conducted 
by the World Bank in areas of Tanzania affected and unaffected by the Burundian and Rwandan 
refugee crises, this study presented discouraging evidence that in the short-term children under 
five in affected areas suffered from impaired anthropometric development, a 15 to 20 percentage 
point increase in the incidence of infectious disease, and a 7 percentage point drop in mortality. 
In the long-term, it was found that such childhood exposure reduced height in early adulthood by 
1.2%, years of schooling by 7.1%, and literacy by 8.6%. Unlike Calderon and Ibanez (2009), 
Baez was able to do without an instrumental variable approach by exploiting the presence of 
natural geographic barriers between western and eastern Kagera, which made the location 
decision of refugees random regarding the outcomes of interest. 
Also using data from the Kagera Health and Demographic Survey (1991-2004), Maystadt 
and Verwimp (2011) tested hypotheses related to economic consumption per adult equivalent of 
Tanzanian households in affected areas of Kagera both before and after the refugee crises. Other 
household characteristics are held constant, including size, primary occupation, landed assets, 
literacy, and individuals who have migrated out of or into the household to or from other regions. 
Consistent with Alix-Garcia and Saah (2009), they found supporting evidence of net 
consumption increases. In this case, even non-agricultural workers experience welfare gains in 
addition to self-employed farmers. However, agricultural laborers still suffered losses due to 
increased labor market competition and increasing prices for many consumption goods.  
Maystadt and Duranton (2014) extend this analysis with updated data from the Kagera 
Health and Demographic Survey through 2010, conceivably allowing them to test for “long-
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term” economic impacts. Results were similar, showing that areas that hosted higher populations 
of Burundian and Rwandan refugees experienced net increases in consumption per adult 
equivalent. The authors use this follow-up article to discuss at greater length the potential modes 
of transmission for this growth, such as agglomeration economies, existences of multiple 
equilibrium, increased provision of local public goods, or enhanced trade with neighboring 
countries after repatriation. They conclude that estimated economic gains are likely due to 
reduced trade costs given improved transportation infrastructure constructed in response to the 
crisis by the international relief community and the Tanzanian government.  
 
Contribution to the Literature 
Based on findings from the existing literature, welfare outcomes of host communities can 
either be positive or negative, and even when hosts benefit overall, there are always winners and 
losers. Of the studies reviewed above, producers whether in the agricultural or urban setting tend 
to be the primary recipients of welfare gains via increased production, rising prices for their 
goods, and reduced wages for employed labor. This, of course, means that consumers and wage 
laborers are usually on the losing side. Children are another particularly vulnerable segment of 
the population and are found to experience negative impacts as measured by health and 
education outcomes. Despite some of these findings, economic gains have exceeded losses in the 
two host communities—Kagera, Tanzania and Darfur, South Sudan—where net welfare has been 
assessed.  
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Such welfare measures, however, do not consider environmental impacts or how potential 
resource shortages could alter host welfare. Alix-Garcia et al. (2012) studied vegetation loss in 
Darfur but did not attempt to show how this affected economic outcomes. Economic outcomes 
are, indeed, intertwined with environmental outcomes, and ideally should be studied together 
when appropriate. Agricultural producers, for one, greatly depend upon water as an input and 
need more of it to increase production or at least as much of it to maintain production. In 
Tanzania, agricultural production was an important factor in capturing the potential benefits of a 
refugee influx via expanded output and increasing prices, but under different local environmental 
conditions where water is scarce, economic gains may be precluded.  
The analysis in this thesis contributes to the forced migration literature by assessing 
environmental and economic outcomes in concert, though narrowly defined. This will help 
researchers better understand the environmental implications of a refugee influx and how, in 
turn, that could alter the economic benefits experienced by host communities.  
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3.  Syrian Refugees in Jordan 
During fieldwork in Jordan during May 2014, I met with relevant government agencies and 
NGOs to learn more about the host country’s challenges in providing for the growing Syrian 
refugee population. Conversations with officials focused largely on the issue of water supply in 
the northern region of Jordan, where the non-camp refugee population is highest, as well as in 
the Zaatari refugee camp—one of the largest refugee settlements in the world. Field interviews 
were conducted in Amman, the Zaatari camp in Mafraq, and at Yarmouk Water Company’s 
(YWC) offices in Irbid (Table 1). 
Hosting refugees is nothing new for Jordan. This country of 6 million (as of 2011) received 
approximately 2 million Palestinian refugees in the 1940s and 60s, most of whom still live in 
Jordan, and more recently hundreds of thousand Iraqi refugees in the 1990s and 2000s. However, 
the ongoing influx of Syrians escaping the brutal civil war in their home country is likely to be 
the most concentrated flow of refugees over time in Jordan’s history. The most reliable estimates 
of registered and un-registered Syrian refugees are between 1.4 and 1.8 million as of the end of 
2014 (UNHCR 2014; MWI 2013).  
Water scarcity is also nothing new for Jordan. An official from the Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation (MWI) noted that there was already a water crisis in Jordan before the Syrian refugees 
arrived (MWI, pers. comm., 2014). Water supply is the greatest challenge for the daily 
operations of the Zaatari Camp, where tankers deliver approximately 1 million gallons/day—
amounting to approximately 1.38 million cubic meters/year (MCM/y). According to UNHCR, 
the camp had a peak population of 202,993 in April 2013. For the one-million-plus refugees 
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outside of camps, consumption is much more difficult to monitor. The water, sanitation, and 
hygiene (WASH) division of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), which oversees all 
water and sanitation policies related to refugees in Jordan, operates under the assumption that 
refugees in cities and towns consume approximately 80 liters per capita per day (l/cap/d) 
(UNICEF, pers. comm. 2014). In total, Syrians could be consuming as much as 8-15% of 
Jordan’s annual renewable groundwater resources (Farishta 2014).  
This has created great tension between Jordanians and Syrians and between considerations of 
economic livelihood and environmental sustainability. Jordan must provide water for Syrians 
but, at the same time, is concerned about how long current supplies will last and how that would 
impact the country’s economy moving forward. The recently completed Disi project, which 
mines water from a 2,000-year-old aquifer along the border with Saudi Arabia and pumps it over 
200 miles to Amman, was supposed to provide water through 2022 but has since been revised to 
2016 (MWI, pers. comm., 2014). Regarding extraction from the primary aquifer in the Amman-
Zarqa basin, the WASH coordinator at UNICEF noted that it is also more like water mining at 
this point because of low recharge; officials are now realizing the potential of complete water 
exhaustion (UNICEF, pers. comm., 2014). Immediate impacts have already been absorbed by 
increased rationing of water at the household level, especially in Mafraq City and Irbid. Whereas 
water was previously delivered to households once per week, now it might be delivered only 
once or twice per month. In such circumstances, households increasingly depend on often 
unreliable private water trucks. 
Jordan’s water system also suffers from high rates of leakage, or non-revenue water, due to 
aging infrastructure and illegal connections (Mercy Corps, pers. comm., 2014). It’s not just that 
pipes are old, either. Jordan has experienced unprecedented rates of urbanization in recent 
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decades; 80% of the population is now urban (UNICEF, pers. comm., 2014). Pipes were built for 
20-year population projections, which were reached more quickly than expected. Add the 
refugee population to the equation, and the problem is compounded. Official leakage rates are 
around 50% (MOPIC 2013) but some believe it could be as high as 75% (Mercy Corps, pers. 
comm., 2014). While such high rates are quite alarming, they do represent an opportunity to 
significantly increase capacity without actually tapping additional resources. For this reason, 
officials strongly support rehabilitation over digging new wells, at least in principle. Indeed, 
several pump stations have been rehabbed, but the interconnectedness of the piped system makes 
it difficult to upgrade the network piecewise. So, digging new wells is the easiest short-term 
solution no matter how unsustainable. Engineers at YWC, the water utility responsible for most 
of the Highlands, have drilled as many as 10 new wells or boreholes since Syrian refugees began 
arriving.  They realize groundwater is being depleted but explain, understandably, that there is 
simply no choice in order to keep pace with increased demand (YWC, pers. comm., 2014). The 
new wells have increased capacity 350-500 m3/hour. A second phase of expansion and rehab is 
expected to increase capacity by another 500 m3/hour.  
Apart from the Jordan Valley on the northwest border of Jordan, the Highlands and the rest 
of the country depend on groundwater. Previous studies have found that the water table in the 
Amman-Zarqa basin drops on average 1.08 meters/year and is projected to be depleted as early 
as 2060 (Goode et al. 2013, data pre-2011). With Jordan’s water resources dwindling, it is 
unclear how the country’s largest consumer—irrigated agriculture—fits into the picture moving 
forward. Agriculture consumes approximately 66% of water resources in Jordan and the specific 
area of study (MWI 2013).   
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In an attempt to help preserve the primary aquifer in the basin, block prices have been in 
place for domestic water use for many years but policy measures like irrigation pricing have only 
been passed relatively recently. In the domestic sector, the average Jordanian household pays 
approximately $0.73/m3 to consume 57 cubic meters of water each quarter (water is billed on a 
quarterly basis) while the average refugee household pays approximately $0.28/m3 to consume 
36 cubic meters each quarter (WAJ 2015).4 But water policy in agriculture is a very delicate 
issue in Jordan given both the spiritual importance of water in traditional Muslim culture and the 
serious implications such measures could have for the livelihood of farmers. The number of large 
well-capitalized farms in the Highlands has been growing over the previous decade, but many 
farmers still live below the poverty line. Most poorer farmers belong to Bedouin tribes, who, 
though poor, collectively possess significant political influence. Perhaps for these reasons, the 
block structure eventually introduced by the Groundwater Control Bylaw No. (85) in 2002 was 
much less effective than originally envisioned. According to the law, water fees are only levied 
on farmers for extraction over 150,000 m3/y, and nearly 70% of the approximately 500 irrigation 
wells in the basin don’t exceed this threshold (Venot et al. 2007). For extraction between 
151,000-200,000 m3/y, the law was reformed in 2004 to reduce fees from $0.035/m3 to 
$0.007/m3, and extraction over 200,000 m3/y is charged $0.085/m3.  
Previous studies have suggested that the bylaw even had the contradictory impact of causing 
well-capitalized farmers to intensify agricultural production to take advantage of better profit 
margins at larger scales (Venot et al. 2007). Gross irrigated area in the Highlands indeed 
increased by 40% from 2004-2010, though it was growing at about the same pace in the years 
                                                          
4 This assumes Jordanians consume 128 l/cap/d and refugees consume 80 l/cap/d. As a comparison, the average 
price of water in the US is approximately $0.40/m3 (FWA 2015). 
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preceding passage of the new bylaw (USAID 2012). Given this strong growth, the Highlands is 
now the largest producer of irrigated agriculture in Jordan but still secondary to the Jordan River 
Valley in terms of total production—both irrigated and rainfed.  
Together, agriculture production in these two regions only comprise a small portion (2-3%) 
of Jordan’s gross domestic product (GDP) and total employment, but 28% of Jordan’s economy 
is considered to be agricultural dependent given strong upstream and downstream linkages 
(IFAD 2001). So, dynamics in the agricultural sector could still have significant repercussions 
for the rest of the economy in general. This may be especially true for households in the 
Highlands where half the population lives in rural areas and are engaged in farming at higher 
rates than the rest of the country (IFAD 2007). Moreover, the region’s household income levels 
are considerably lower than the Jordanian average. While Jordan is considered a non-fragile non-
OECD lower middle income country, Mafraq and Zarqa—with household income levels 17% 
and 12% below the national average—more closely resemble characteristics of fragile low-
income countries (i.e., a place with a Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating 
below 3.2 and per capita income of 975 USD or less) (World Bank 2010). Because of these 
characteristics, the impact of Syrian refugees, a curtailment of irrigation water, or both are likely 
to be most acute here.  
Next, I present a general economic model in order to more precisely identify the potential 
welfare implications for agricultural producers in refugee host communities under conditions of 
resource scarcity.  
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4.  Model Description 
 
In this section, I describe a well-known modeling framework within water resource 
economics most popularly conceptualized by Gisser and Sanchez (1980) and later modified by 
many others (Noel et al. 1980; Lee et al. 1981; Feinerman and Knapp 1983; Allen and Gisser 
1984; Nieswiadomy 1985; Kim et al. 1989; Brill and Burness 1994; Koundouri and Christou 
2000; Tsur and Zemel 2004; Esteban and Albiac 2012; Cachorro et al. 2014). The model 
establishes certain economic relationships and integrates them with fundamental hydrological 
functions describing a single-cell aquifer in order to show how the decisions of water users might 
affect groundwater resources over time and, as such, determine extraction rate(s) that would 
maximize the economic value of the aquifer (or, that is, the social welfare of its users). While the 
original model makes several restrictions—e.g. infinite hydraulic conductivity, constant return 
flow and recharge, a time-independent linear water demand function, and fixed irrigation 
technology—its general insights, in most cases, have held up even after relaxing many of these 
assumptions (Koundouri 2004). Below, I present the model, noting modifications made by the 
author, and explaining important analytical intuition in order to understand how a migration 
shock would be expected to affect groundwater resources.  
Assuming that demand for water is 
 
𝑊 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝, ( 1 ) 
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where p is the price of water and a and b are coefficients of the demand function. Costs are linear 
such that  
 
𝐶̅ = 𝑧 − 𝑐𝐺, ( 2 ) 
 
where c is the slope of the cost function and z is defined as the product of the irrigation surface 
level (SL) and unit pumping costs (c’), i.e. the increased costs per MCM of water pumped per 
meter decline in the water table. Dynamics of the aquifer, 
 
?̇? = −(1−∝)𝑊 + 𝑟, ( 3 ) 
 
are a function of the recharge rate (r), return flow coefficient (α), and demand for water (W). 
Rearranging equation (1) to express p as an explicit function of W, then subtracting total costs 
(2), gives net benefits from water:  
 
(
𝑎
𝑏
) 𝑊 − (
1
2𝑏
) 𝑊2 − (𝑧 − 𝑐𝐺)𝑊. ( 4 ) 
  
Equation (4) is critical to the decision of how much water to pump, which is determined by 
maximizing the present value of future benefit streams, given some discount rate (ρ), the 
dynamics of the aquifer (3), and initial conditions (𝐺0): 
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           max
𝑊(.)
∫ [(
𝑎
𝑏
) 𝑊 − (
1
2𝑏
) 𝑊2 − (𝑧 − 𝑐𝐺)𝑊] 𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑑𝑡
∞
0
,       ( 5 ) 
where 
?̇? = −(1−∝)𝑊 + 𝑟,  
 
       𝐺(0) = 𝐺0       given,  
 
     𝑊 ≥ 0       𝐺 ≥ 0. 
  
The above constitutes an optimal control problem, with the dynamics of the aquifer (3) as the 
governing differential equation, the water stock G(t) as the state variable, and water pumped W(t) 
as the control variable. From the performance criterion (5), the Hamiltonian is written as 
 
                            ℋ = [(
𝑎
𝑏
) 𝑊 − (
1
2𝑏
) 𝑊2 − (𝑧 − 𝑐𝐺)𝑊] 𝑒𝜌𝑡 + 𝜆(−(1 − 𝛼)𝑊 + 𝑟), ( 6 ) 
 
in which the adjoint variable, , can be interpreted as the scarcity value of water. For this version 
of the model, Chachorro et al. (2014) show via the maximum principle that the following system 
of two differential equations can be established: 
 
                                     ?̇? = 𝑟 − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑎 − 𝑧𝑏) − 𝑐𝑏(1 − 𝛼)𝐺 + 𝜆𝑏(1 − 𝛼)2, ( 7 ) 
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?̇? = 𝑐(𝑎 − 𝑧𝑏) − 𝑐2𝑏𝐺 + (𝑐𝑏(1 − 𝛼) + 𝜌)𝜆, ( 8 ) 
 
which are then solved simultaneously to, first, find the steady state solutions,  
 
 𝑊∞ =
𝑟
1−∝
 ,                            ( 9 ) 
 
                                                           𝐺∞ =
𝑟
𝑐𝑏(1−∝)
+
𝑟
𝜌
−
𝑎
𝑐𝑏
+
𝑧
𝑐
 . ( 10 ) 
 
Finally, the extraction and stock paths that maximize the present value of future benefit streams 
are given by 
 
                       𝑊∗(𝑡) =
𝑟
1−∝
−
𝜌2
1−𝛼
𝑒𝜌2𝑡(𝐺0 − 𝐺∞),                                        ( 11 ) 
 
   𝐺∗(𝑡) = 𝑒𝜌2𝑡(𝐺0 − 𝐺∞) + 𝐺∞,                                     ( 12 ) 
 
where G(0) = G0 and 𝜌2 is the negative root of the characteristic polynomial: 
 
    𝜌2 =
𝜌−√𝜌2+4𝑐𝑏(1−∝)𝜌
2
 .                             ( 13 ) 
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This thesis does not offer comment on the model’s original use by Gisser and Sanchez 
(1980), which was to compare the above forward-looking model solution, (11) and (12), to that 
of myopic water extraction, in which water users decide how much water to pump each year by 
equating the marginal cost of pumping with the marginal physical product of water—i.e. without 
accounting for the scarcity value of water.5 Rather, the current research is concerned with how 
the aquifer system, as defined above, responds to shocks to the resource and how such could be 
expected to impact welfare as defined by equation (5).  
This is similar to Chachorro et al.’s (2014) use of the model, except, where they were 
concerned with supply-side shocks (e.g. climate change, etc.), I am concerned with the effect of a 
demand-side shock, namely, a large refugee influx. In either case, it is plausible for the resource 
shock to enter the model via a change in the recharge rate, though, given the demand shock 
considered, the adjustment of the recharge rate in the model should technically be interpreted as 
natural recharge, net of refugee water consumption. Thus, the model is constructed in the same 
way as in Chachorro et al. (2014) but motivated differently; and by incorporating repatriation or 
resettlement into the model, I also consider a reversal of the shock. Specifically, I adapt the so-
called “non-adaptation” version of the model in which the date of the shock is unknown. It is 
implemented using the original specification above, except equation (5) is solved twice, first, 
such that 
 
                                                          
5 By equating 𝐶̅ = 𝑧 − 𝑐𝐺 with 𝑝 from water demand function, one finds that 𝑊 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑧 − 𝑏𝑐𝐺, which is said to 
govern myopic groundwater use. Gisser and Sanchez (1980) show analytically and empirically that in large enough 
aquifers, the discount rate practically disappears from the solution to the optimal control problem and thus is not 
significantly different from the myopic, or “competitive”, solution. The so-called Gisser-Sanchez effect, then, 
warrants that little benefit results from public management of the aquifer. For the full resolution of this problem, 
see Gisser and Sanchez (1980). 
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?̇? = −(1−∝)𝑊 + 𝑟1          and,                                           ( 14 ) 
 
               𝐺(0) = 𝐺0,      
 
then, such that  
 
 ?̇? = −(1−∝)𝑊 + 𝑟2          and,                                           ( 15 ) 
 
                 𝐺(𝑡𝑎) = 𝐺0,      
 
where the initial stock level in (15), 𝐺(𝑡𝑎) = 𝐺0, is equal to the stock level in year 𝑡𝑎 in (14). The 
model solutions are then combined for when 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑎 such that 𝑟 = 𝑟1 and when year 𝑡 > 𝑡𝑎 such 
that 𝑟 = 𝑟2.  
Let us now consider more closely the role the recharge rate (r) plays in the above model. 
First, it is observed that the steady state solutions are increasing monotonic functions of r given 
that ∝ −1 is always negative: 
 
𝜕𝑊∞
𝜕𝑟
=
−1
∝−1
 ,   ( 16 ) 
 
𝜕𝐺∞
𝜕𝑟
=
1
𝜌
−
1
𝑏𝑐(𝛼−1)
. ( 17 ) 
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This, of course, makes sense; the more water entering aquifer, the more one will be able to pump 
in the long run and the greater the stock of the resource will be. Since the extraction rate is still 
governed by the dynamics of the aquifer, it follows that the amount of water pumped in 𝑡 = ∞ in 
response to an increase in r does not increase to the extent that the long run stock of the resource 
drops or stays the same—it should always increase, as well. Alternatively, the lower the value of 
r, the lower the steady state of extractions and stock of the resource. To be clear, a larger shock 
to the resource means less water will be available in the long run. 
I also note the obvious conclusion, based on equations (9) and (10), that the date of the 
resource shock, 𝑡𝑎, has no effect on the steady state extraction and stock solutions, such that  
 
𝜕𝑊∞
𝜕𝑡𝑎
= 0, ( 18 ) 
 
𝜕𝐺∞
𝜕𝑡𝑎
= 0. ( 19 ) 
 
This follows given that water users do not know the date of the shock and cannot account for it 
in their pumping decisions. Only the magnitude of the shock, all else equal, will determine long-
run adaptation.  
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Analyses performed with the model  
 
In Section 6, I present the results of three different analyses based on the model just 
described. First, I perform a sensitivity analysis to understand how the economic parameters can 
be expected to affect model outcomes. Second, based on data presented in Section 5, I proceed 
with an empirical application for the Amman-Zarqa basin in Jordan, initially assuming that the 
refugee influx is permanent and occurs in 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑎 = 0.
6 Finally, I consider the possibility of 
repatriation or resettlement of refugees (i.e. the influx is not permanent) where a reversal of the 
shock, at least in part, occurs in 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝 ≠ 0. For each of the empirical applications, a post-
optimality analysis is conducted in which water is allocated between the domestic and 
agricultural sectors based on expected consumption, respectively, in each scenario. More 
specifically, I assume one water demand function that represents both sectors. Once the model is 
solved, I allocate annual water availability, first, to domestic use and, second, to irrigation use 
and compare associated welfare estimates and how they evolve through time according to 
whether the refugee influx is permanent or not. Calibration of scenarios is described in more 
detail in the next section. 
                                                          
6 In the case that 𝑡𝑎 = 0, the model need only to be solved once according to dynamics of the aquifer (15) such 
that 𝐺(𝑡𝑎) = 𝐺(0) = 𝐺0. 
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5. Data 
 
I collected data from a variety of sources. Values of model parameters for the Amman Wadi 
As-Sir aquifer, or the B2-A7 formation, in the Amman-Zarqa basin are given in Table 2. 
Description of economic and hydrological data, as well as calibration of scenarios, for the 
empirical application in Section 6 follows in order. 
Fitch (2001), as part of a USAID study, conducted a survey of 156 farms in the Jordanian 
Highlands; based on the average energy costs and depth to water table, unit pumping costs in US 
Dollars (USD) per MCM per meter of lift were found to be around 450 USD/MCM m.7 This is 
used to calculate the linear cost function (2). Unfortunately, an estimate of the demand for water 
equation (1) for either the domestic or agricultural sectors across the entire Amman-Zarqa basin 
is not available. Tabieh et al. (2012) estimated a household water demand function for Zarqa 
City, which is located between Amman and Mafraq City. They found demand for water to be 
almost perfectly inelastic; a 10% increase in the price of water only caused a 0.04% decrease in 
demand. According to a meta-analysis of the literature, demand for irrigation water at low price 
levels is also often very inelastic (FAO 2004). Venot and Molle (2008), though they didn’t 
estimate a demand equation, did present evidence that an increase in the price of water in the 
Jordanian Highlands does very little to curtail irrigation water use below all but very cost-
prohibitive price thresholds. Based on these findings, I use demand parameters that imply a 
highly inelastic response to the price of water. Such assumptions are also consistent with demand 
                                                          
7 Energy costs for electricity varied from 30 fils/m3 to 130 fils/m3, depending on the depth of the well. A small 
number of farmers instead of electricity use diesel fuel, which is about 20% higher than the cost of electricity. 
Average pumping depth in Fitch’s (2001) study was 191 meters. A fils equals 1/1000 of a Jordanian Dinar (JD) and 1 
JD equals 1.41 USD. 
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parameters used elsewhere in the water resource economics literature (e.g. by Chacorro et al. 
(2014) and Esteban & Albiac (2012) in their study of the Western La Mancha aquifer in Spain).  
Hydrological parameters are drawn from technical reports published by the government of 
Jordan and academic researchers. Surface level (660 m) and initial water table (510 m) are from 
MWI (2013). Al Muhamid (2005) reports that the annual recharge is 56 MCM and area of the 
aquifer is 4,710 km2. Finally, Venot et al. (2009) estimate the return flow coefficient to be 0.25. I 
assume a discount rate of 0.05. 
Four scenarios are calibrated for the empirical application. Scenarios 1a and 1b are based on 
UNHCR refugee population figures for year-end 2014 (UNHCR 2014), while 2a and 2b use less 
conservative estimates produced by the government of Jordan (MWI 2013) (Table 3). Figures are 
adjusted given that approximately 65% of Syrian refugees reside in the northern governorates of 
Mafraq, Irbid, Jerash, Aljoun, and Zarqa, which receive their domestic water supply from the 
B2-A7 aquifer in the Amman-Zarqa basin (UNHCR 2014).8 Scenarios also take into account that 
Amman receives 19% of its water from the same aquifer.  Each scenario is calibrated under two 
different assumptions about water consumption patterns for refugees inside and outside of 
camps. Water consumption in the Zaatari camp is approximately 32 l/cap/d (UNICEF 2014).  
UNICEF estimates that refugee consumption outside of camps is approximately 80 l/cap/d 
(UNICEF, pers. comm. 2014). However, it is widely perceived that Syrians are not accustomed 
to conserving water to the extent that Jordanians are—and thus consume more water than the 
average Jordanian (MWI, pers. comm. 2014). The Jordanian government and international 
donors are even funding an extensive communications campaign to raise awareness among 
                                                          
8 For Zarqa, only refugees residing in Zarqa City are considered. The Al-Azraq refugee camp, which is in the eastern 
part of the Zarqa governorate is not in the Amman-Zarqa basin. 
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Syrian refugees about Jordan’s acute water shortage and to encourage them to adopt water-
saving practices (GIZ, pers. comm. 2014). So, it is reasonable to assume for an upper bound that 
Syrians outside of camps could be consuming at least as much as the average Jordanian or 128 
l/cap/d.  
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6.  Results 
In this section, I first present results of the sensitivity analysis. Then, I proceed with the 
empirial application for the Amman-Zarqa basin in order to determine the welfare impacts due to 
a large refugee influx, with specific focus on the welfare of agricultural households in the host 
community.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Before applying the model to the specific area of study, it is useful to perform a sensitivity 
analysis on the economic parameters in order to gain a better understanding of how the model 
works and how results of the empirical application might change under different assumptions. I 
follow Nieswiadomy (1985) and Feinerman and Knapp (1983) in designing the sensitivity 
analysis and selecting the parameters of focus. Also, the demand slope, demand intercept, and 
unit costs of pumping are likely more subject to measurement error compared to other model 
parameters and, therefore, warrant special consideration before interpreting results. 
Table 4 details alternative values for each parameter in the analysis and the associated 
welfare calculations. It is observed that benefits from groundwater extraction decrease as either 
the demand slope or unit pumping costs increase. At least in the latter case, the reason is 
relatively straightforward: as pumping costs increase, individuals must use less water or use the 
same amount at higher cost. On the other hand, it is observed that benefits from groundwater 
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extraction increase as the demand curve shifts up (i.e. the intercept increases). Again, this makes 
sense as it means that individuals are able to use more water or that water can be allocated to 
more individuals at the same unit cost. These findings are, of course, consistent with what we 
would expect. 
I also report calculated arc elasticities for each parameter in Table 4. This measures the 
percentage change in welfare from a one percent change in the parameter value. It is observed  
that results are quite sensitive (i.e. elasticity > |1|) to changes in the economic parameters of the 
model, with unit pumping costs causing the largest change, then the intercept and slope in 
respective order. This is consistent with previous findings in the literature (Nieswiadomy 1985; 
Feinerman and Knapp 1983) and should be considered when interpreting results of the empirical 
application.9 
 
Empirical Application 
Taking t = 0 as the first full year of significant refugee influx, 2013, and based on the given 
parameters (Table 2), results for the base scenario show initial extraction levels at approximately 
168 MCM/year, which is within current estimates of actual extraction (Figure 2) (Venot & Molle 
2008; Farishta 2014). The aquifer reaches a steady state of pumping (𝑊∞) at approximately 75 
MCM/year by 2048, and the welfare of all water users (5) is just over 11 million USD (Table 5). 
                                                          
9 As an additional note, Feinerman and Knapp (1983) test additional parameters and find that results are also 
relatively sensitive to area times storativity and the discount rate (with inverse relationships) but are insensitive to 
other parameters. 
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Under the most conservative assumptions of the Syrian refugee population and associated water 
consumption patterns (Scenario 1a), 𝑊∞ falls to 40 MCM/year and total welfare is reduced by 
approximately 25%. In this scenario, water can no longer be allocated to agriculture as of 2029. 
According to the worst case scenario (Scenario 2b), a steady state is not reached and the B2-A7 
aquifer will be entirely depleted by 2040—a full 20 years ahead of previous forecasts.10 Given 
the new demand for water by refugees and the decreasing amount of water pumped, agriculture 
can no longer receive water allocations after 2020. In this scenario, total welfare is reduced by 
52% and by 71% for agricultural producers. While the nominal welfare values are relatively 
small, they, of course, only include the direct benefits from water in the production process—not 
from associated agricultural productivity and other closely linked sectors. The direction of the 
change in welfare as it relates to extraction rates and the water table level is what is most 
important for my purposes. Given the predominantly rural and agricultural livelihood of 
households in this region of Jordan, we would expect the overall monetary losses due to 
decreased agricultural productivity to be quite large. And implications would likely stretch far 
beyond monetary losses, perhaps quickening the pace of urbanization and the societal tensions 
thereof. 
Results reported in Table 5 assume that Syrian refugees will permanently remain in Jordan. 
While this would not be unprecedented, it is unlikely. Palestinian refugees, almost all of whom 
have remained in Jordan since arriving over 50 years ago, represent a very unique case. Perhaps 
more comparable is the situation of Afghani refugees in Pakistan, who, despite some returning 
within the past ten years, have remained in large numbers in Pakistan since fleeing their country 
                                                          
10 According to USGS study by Good et al. (2013) conducted before the Syrian refugee crisis began, the B2-A7 
aquifer will be depleted by 2060 if trends were extrapolated.  
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beginning in 1978. Still, optimism would have that the war in Syria will eventually resolve and 
Syrians will be able to return to their home. This is the stated desire of most Syrians in Jordan, 
and repatriation under stable conditions or a “just return” is a primary objective of UNHCR 
(UNHCR pers. comm. 2014). There is, however, hesitation in assuming full repatriation; 
between 1998 and 2007, only 11.4 million refugees worldwide repatriated with far fewer 
receiving resettlement in a third country (Megan 2013). The fate of refugees—repatriation, 
resettlement, or local integration in the country of first asylum—is a complex issue, the 
determinants of which are unique to each refugee crisis and are outside the scope of this study. 
For the purposes of the following simulations, though, an 80% repatriation rate is assumed.   
 As described in Section 4, to model the impact if repatriation occurs in year 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝 = 10, I 
increase r from year 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝 onward by the amount that water consumption is expected to decrease 
as a result of the refugee population returning to their home country. Consistent with 
expectations, social welfare of agricultural households will increase relative to the scenarios 
discussed above, though it will still be lower than in the base scenario (Table 6). Once 
repatriation occurs, the extraction path shifts so that 𝑊∞ will be the same as if the new higher 
recharge rate were always the norm, which conforms to previously discussed theoretical 
conclusions based on the partial derivative 
𝜕𝑊∞
𝜕𝑟
.  This means that the welfare externality might 
only be temporary and accumulate only during the period between initial influx and eventual 
repatriation. However, if the refugee influx is large enough and refugees stay long enough, 
repatriation may be too late.  
In scenarios 2a and 2b, while the aquifer is never depleted, the respective extraction paths fall 
below levels capable of sustaining agricultural activity. For the latter case, extraction levels are 
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too low to maintain agriculture for the final three years of the influx period, then, once 
repatriation occurs, it is able to resume at a lessened capacity until 2036 when it becomes 
permanently unsustainable. The aquifer will only be depleted in the case that 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝 ≥ 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝, where 
𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝 is the year of aquifer depletion. Thus, for example, if 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝 = 30, scenario 2b will be 
identical to the same scenario in the original specification (Table 5), as the aquifer is depleted 
before repatriation occurs (Table 8).11 Results reported in Table 8 assume that once the aquifer is 
depleted, i.e. W*(t) = 0, water can no longer be extracted and therefore does not contribute to 
welfare beyond that point—in this case, after 2040. It is possible that water could again be 
extracted when repatriation occurs and r returns to previous levels. However, given that such 
high extraction rates have already occurred and that the aquifer stock would be at relatively low 
levels, it is plausible that salinity may render the aquifer obsolete for agricultural purposes even 
after repatriation.12 This suggests that the externality on welfare could be long-lived, with the 
host community feeling the effects long after refugees are gone.  
   
  
                                                          
11 For model results if repatriation occurs in 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑝 = 20, see Figure 4 and Table 6. 
12 For simplicity, this study assumes that water in sector i has a constant value at any positive extraction rate, 
regardless of the salinity level. 
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7.  Policy Discussion 
When considering policy solutions that would alleviate impacts on the host population in 
Jordan, welfare estimates in this analysis should probably be treated as upper bounds. This is the 
case for a few reasons.  
First, the demand for water function in the model treats agricultural producers and domestic 
users identically and makes strict assumptions about how water users respond to rising prices. By 
using an inelastic linear demand curve, the model will not accurately reflect the potential 
rationing behavior of water users at high price levels under strong assumptions of water 
conservation. However, this is perhaps not as far from reality in Jordan as one may think. 
Domestic water consumption is already at relatively low levels in Jordan, levels that are more 
likely to be concomitant with inelastic portions of the water demand curve. Moreover, as 
mentioned previously, nearly 70% of irrigation wells in the Amman-Zarqa basin operate at levels 
for which no water fees are charged.  
Secondly, when interpreting results, one should also keep in mind that the model does not 
consider the possibility for adaptive irrigation technology in the agricultural sector. This means 
that farmers are treated as unable to recover any of their production losses, for example, by 
adopting less water intensive crops, improving water application efficiencies, or merely 
switching to rainfed agriculture. Assuming farmers increasingly engage in any of these activities 
in the face of water scarcity and assuming such are profitable, even in the least, would lessen 
negative welfare impacts. Previous studies suggest that most vegetable farmers in the Amman-
Zarqa basin over-irrigate their crops (though orchard farms are under-irrigated) (Venot et al. 
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2007). Given such conditions, overall efficiency of water use is at 62%. Helping farmers use 
water more efficiently and implement other potential adaptive measures could be a policy 
solution of itself. 
Finally, the analysis does not consider the potential welfare-increasing dynamics of price 
effects. Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, there has been clear upward pressure on the food 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) in Jordan, especially for items largely produced in domestic markets 
such as vegetables, dairy, eggs, and meat products and less so for items that are mostly imported 
like cereals and legumes (UNDP 2013). The overall food CPI has increased in the range of 12-
20% between 2011 and 2013. However, it should be noted that the prices of production inputs in 
the agricultural sector have also risen given the disruption of regional supply chains since the 
Syrian crisis began. So, the net welfare effect of price changes on farmers is unclear. Insofar as 
they are positive, the results of the above analysis likely represent welfare losses that in this 
respect as well should be considered upper bounds.  
With these considerations in mind, any set of solutions intended to alleviate the acute welfare 
impact on Jordanian households corroborated by the model in this paper needs to address the 
largest current water user: agriculture. Agriculture is the predominant livelihood for households 
throughout the northern governorates. A sharp decline of agriculture in the Highlands could 
potentially devastate the region—already one of the poorest in Jordan—and potentially send a 
ripple-effect throughout the national economy, not a desirable situation for a stable country 
which to this point has survived the tremors of the Arab Spring. Policy solutions should include 
the following. 
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 As observed in my field research, water infrastructure in Jordan suffers from high leakage 
rates, and while the sentiment to focus on rehabilitation is present, it is often easier to increase 
water supply by simply digging new wells. Though the water network serves domestic use, it 
could have significant alleviating effects on the agricultural sector, as well, since water savings 
in the former would mean less allocations away from the latter. Consider, for example, the 
Tabaqet Fahel pump station which was rehabilitated for a cost of 250,000 USD and increased 
utilization by 1.840 MCM/y or 80 liters per day for 63,000 people (Mercy Corps 2014). In 
addition, the Zabdah reservoir project reduced leaks by 0.788 MCM/y at a cost of 530,000 USD. 
On average, these two projects cost 0.29 USD per cubic meter of water without increasing actual 
extraction rates. Construction of two new wells at the Zaatari camp cost about the same amount 
or 0.32 USD per cubic meter—but increased extraction by 1.4 MCM/y. Thus, at least, for 
isolated infrastructure like wells and reservoirs, rehabilitation seems to be more cost effective 
than digging new wells, even without considering the opportunity cost of water. Rehabilitation of 
subsurface pipes throughout the water network is likely to pose greater difficulty. Even so, it is 
worth consideration, particularly if reality is closer to assumptions of the more conservative 
scenarios (1a and 1b). That is, if the shock from refugees is large but not catastrophic, solutions 
that might appear expensive under normal circumstances might be worthwhile under conditions 
of significant water scarcity as they could preserve the life of the aquifer and offset the shock. 
However, if the aquifer would be depleted regardless of infrastructure improvements, the cost of 
reducing leakage would be in vain and merely add to welfare losses. 
Other policy solutions that should be considered regard alternative water sources. Currently, 
an estimated 100 MCM/y of treated wastewater is produced in the Amman-Zarqa basin, but 
essentially all of it is conveyed to the Jordan Valley for cultivation of higher value crops (Seder 
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& Abdel-Jabbar 2010). It is unlikely that current allocations would be redirected, but plans have 
been produced recommending that nearly 25 MCM/y in future new allocations be utilized for 
either agriculture or industry in the Highlands (MWI 2001). Implementation of such a plan could 
ensure that 𝑡𝑎𝑔 does not arrive, or if it does, that Jordan is better prepared to make that transition. 
While desalination projects, namely the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal, could also serve as an 
important source of water supply in the future, as currently planned it is intended primarily to 
provide domestic water to Amman and small amounts of irrigation water to the Jordan River 
Valley—not the Highlands (MWI, pers. comm. 2014). Thus, such a project would only help the 
current situation to the extent the City of Amman’s demand for water on the Amman-Zarqa basin 
is reduced, which presumably could be the case if desalination was implemented.  
A more bottom-up approach to increase water supply via alternative sources is by 
household level water management projects, such as the rainwater cistern program operated by 
the local Jordanian community based organization (CBO), Jerasia. Dating back to before the 
Syrian crisis began, this micro but potentially effective strategy has provided 54 Jordanian and 
refugee households in Jerash with loans of 1,400 USD to install a rainwater catchment and 
cistern system capable of collecting 60-90 cubic meters of water per year, which can provide 25-
50% of water needs for a five-person household (Mercy Corps 2014; Author’s calculations). For 
an initial investment equivalent to the cost of rehabilitating or digging two wells, such a program 
could potentially provide thousands of households with water. Operationalizing to this scale, 
however, would take about 10-15 years based on the length of current loan cycles (i.e. about 
three years). Despite the limited scope and drawbacks of such projects, they have the potential to 
build local capacity and give households—both Jordanian and Syrian—increased water security, 
reducing refugee-host tensions over water. Such community water projects can complement 
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large scale efforts to increase infrastructure capacity, especially in times of heightened crisis 
when network deliveries don’t materialize and water trucks are fewer and farther between. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
Though natural resource impacts are often cited as a primary source of tension between 
refugee and host communities, there is a lack of economic research in this area—particularly in 
regard to water. Therefore, this thesis conducted a dynamic economic analysis of the impacts of 
refugee communities on host water security, focusing on the case of Syrian refugees in Jordan.  
It was shown that, in countries suffering from pre-existing water scarcity, the welfare of 
agricultural households is likely to decrease, contrary to previous research in the economics 
literature. This is important because previous studies have found that, in host communities 
experiencing overall net benefits from a refugee influx, agricultural producers accounted for the 
largest welfare gain among host households. Thus, if agricultural producers, in fact, do not 
experience such gains, it is more likely that a refugee influx could impose a net loss on hosts. 
Moreover, it was found that a shock to water resources due to forced migration could cause a 
long-lived externality in host communities by shifting the extraction path so that the aquifer is 
depleted before a steady state is reached. However, if repatriation occurs before aquifer 
depletion, increased recharge should allow extraction to return to higher levels. In this case, 
externalities could still be long-lived; depending on extraction levels that occurred during the 
influx phase, agriculture may no longer be viable even after repatriation.  
Conclusions of this thesis are limited on a few fronts. First, I assume irrigated agricultural 
production is viable for all positive rates of extraction. In reality, if an aquifer is being mined, 
irrigation water quality (e.g. high salinity levels) is likely to become a prohibiting factor even if 
extraction is still otherwise economically viable. Second, as mentioned in the policy discussion, I 
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also assume farmers are unable to adapt to reduced water availability, for example, either by 
switching to improved irrigation technology, engaging in dryland farming, or utilizing alternative 
water resource supplies—e.g. wastewater reuse or desalination assuming such infrastructure is 
available to farmers. These are options that, as discussed above, have already been implemented 
in Jordan in some capacity (wastewater reuse) or have been in advanced planning stages for 
several years (desalination). Thus, any long-term assessment of Jordan’s water resources should 
include them. Further research in any of these areas would add value to the analysis presented in 
this thesis. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: List of Organizations Interviewed 
 
  
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Bjorn Zimprich - Communications Coordinator, German-Jordan Water Program
Injaz Jordan
Muhammed Qalid - Refugee Program Manager
Mercy Corps. Jordan
Ghazboun Hassan - Chief Water Engineer
Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI)
Nisreen Haddadin - Director of Water Demand Management
Oxfam Jordan
Pierre Dassonville - WASH Coordinator
United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF)
Jamaal Shah - WASH Coordinator, Jordan Country Office
Habeb Ahmen -WASH Officer, Zaatari Refugee Camp
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Kilian Kleinschmidt - Camp Director, Zaatari Refugee Camp 
Tom Cocran - Environmental Specialist, Zaatari Refugee Camp
University of Jordan
Dr. Marwan Raggad - Faculty, Center for Land, Water, and Environment
Yarmouk Water Company
Salameh Mahasneh - Investment Program Manager
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Table 2: Values of parameters of Amman Wadi As-Sir (B2-A7) Aquifer 
 
 
Table 3: Syrian refugee population and estimated water consumption 
 
 
 
 
Parameter Description Units Value Source
b Water demand slope (MCM/yr)^2 per $ 0.0915
a Water demand intercept MCM/yr 8,425.6
z Pumping costs intercept $/MCM 293,040 c'*SL
c Pumping costs slope $/MCM^2 3.14 c'/A*S
c' Unit costs of pumping $/MCM m 444 Fitch, 2001
r Natural recharge MCM/yr 56 Al Muhamid, 2005
G0 Initial stock level MCM 66,270 H0*A*S
H0 Initial water table Meters 469 MWI, 2013
SL Surface elevation Meters 660 MWI, 2013
A Aquifer area Square km 4,710 Al Muhamid, 2005
S Sorativity coefficient Unitless 0.03 MWI, 2000
ρ Social discount rate Annual 0.05
α Return flow coefficient Unitless 0.25 Venot, 2009
Recharge
l/cap/d MCM/y Total MCM/y
Camp 88,682         32 1.036            
Community 876,840       80 25.604          
Camp 88,682         32 1.036            
Community 876,840       128 40.966          
Camp 202,993       32 2.371            
Community 1,686,061   80 49.233          
Camp 202,993       32 2.371            
Community 1,686,061   128 78.773          
note: the value of recharge in the model refers to actual recharge, net of refugee water needs
56.0
-25.181.144          
2a 51.604          
29.4
14.0
4.4
1b 42.002          
26.640          1a
base
Refugee PopulationScenario
Refugee Water Consumption
2b
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis using demand slope, intercept, and pumping cost 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Net benefits for each scenario 
 
 
  
0.0622                     303,190 
0.1555 941                           
4,203.5        520                           
9,437.2        48,867                     
300 211,030                   
600 1,383                       
Demand intercept
Demand slope -2.33
Unit pumping cost 
ElasticityValue
Net Benefits 
(thousand USD)
-2.98
2.59
Scenario Agriculture Domestic Total
base 5,548           5,456           11,003         
1a 2,981           5,301           8,282           
(-46.3%) (-2.8%) (-24.7%)
1b 2,402           4,709           7,111           
(-56.7%) (-13.7%) (-35.4%)
2a 2,150           4,377           6,527           
(-61.2%) (-19.8%) (-40.7%)
2b 1,636           3,643           5,279           
(-70.5%) (-33.2%) (-52.0%)
note:          is the year water can no longer be allocated to agriculture, and           is the          
date of aquifer depletion. Percent change from base in parentheses.
Net Benefits (thousand USD)
𝑡𝑎𝑔  202 
𝑡𝑎𝑔  202 
𝑡𝑎𝑔  2023
𝑡𝑎𝑔   2020
𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝  20 0
𝑡𝑎𝑔 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝
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Table 6: Net benefits if repatriation occurs after 10 years 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Net benefits if repatriation occurs after 20 years 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Agriculture Domestic Total
base 5,548           5,456           11,003         
1a 4,025           6,152           10,177         
(-27.4%) (12.8%) (-7.5%)
1b 3,283           6,389           9,672           
(-40.8%) (17.1%) (-12.1%)
2a 2,898           6,446           9,344           
(-47.8%) (18.2%) (-15.1%)
2b 2,074           6,218           8,292           
(-62.6%) (14.0%) (-24.6%)
note:          is the year water can no longer be allocated to agriculture. Percent change         
from base in parentheses.
Net Benefits (thousand USD)
𝑡𝑎𝑔  20  
𝑡𝑎𝑔  2020 − 22
𝑡𝑎𝑔  203 
𝑡𝑎𝑔
𝑡𝑎𝑔  20 1
Scenario Agriculture Domestic Total
base 5,548           5,456           11,003         
1a 3,352           6,127           9,479           
(-39.6%) (12.3%) (-13.9%)
1b 2,590           6,063           8,653           
(-53.3%) (11.1%) (-21.4%)
2a 2,266           5,890           8,156           
(-59.1%) (8.0%) (-25.9%)
2b 1,648           5,080           6,729           
(-70.3%) (-6.9%) (-38.9%)
note:          is the year water can no longer be allocated to agriculture. Percent change
from base in parentheses
Net Benefits (thousand USD)
𝑡𝑎𝑔  202 − 32
𝑡𝑎𝑔  2023 − 32
𝑡𝑎𝑔  20  
𝑡𝑎𝑔  2020 − 32
𝑡𝑎𝑔  203 
𝑡𝑎𝑔
𝑡𝑎𝑔  202 − 32
𝑡𝑎𝑔  20 1
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Table 8: Net benefits if repatriation occurs after 30 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Agriculture Domestic Total
base 5,548           5,456           11,003         
1a 3,121           5,883           9,004           
(-43.7%) (7.8%) (-18.2%)
1b 2,436           5,578           8,014           
(-56.1%) (2.2.%) (-27.2%)
2a 2,157           5,298           7,456           
(-61.1%) (-2.9%) (-32.2%)
2b 1,636           3,643           5,279           
(-70.5%) (-33.2%) (-52.0%)
note:          is the year water can no longer be allocated to agricultureand            is the 
date of aquifer depletion. Percent change from base in parentheses.
Net Benefits (thousand USD)
𝑡𝑎𝑔  202 −  2
𝑡𝑎𝑔  202 −  2
𝑡𝑎𝑔  20 1
𝑡𝑎𝑔  2023 −  2
𝑡𝑎𝑔  20  
𝑡𝑎𝑔   2020
𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝  20 0
𝑡𝑎𝑔 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑝
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Figure 1: Location map of study area (Source: OCHA 2013; Legend added by author) 
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Figure 2: Water pumped, W*(t), and water table level, H*(t), at different recharge rates, r.13 
 
                                                          
13 From equation (5), H*(t) can be obtained by dividing G*(t) by A*S 
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Figure 3: Water pumped, W*(t), at different recharge rates, r, if repatriation occurs after 10 years 
 
Figure 4: Water pumped, W*(t), at different recharge rates, r, if repatriation occurs after 20 years 
 
48 
 
  
Figure 5: Water pumped, W*(t), at different recharge rates, r, if repatriation occurs after 30 years 
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